United Nations by unknown
Current Developments
United Nations
Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States (1966)
GEORGE WINTHROP HAIGHT,* DEPARTMENTAL EDITOR
Because an understanding of contemporary international law
problems is essential for all concerned with the development and
maintenance of a sound international order, and because the thrust of
communist concepts threatens constantly to disrupt such an order, it is
appropriate that this first report on U.N. activities review this year's
proceedings of the Special Committee on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.
The Committee continued the work of an earlier body established in
1963 by General Assembly Resolution 1966 (XVIII). That earlier
body met in Mexico City in September and October 1964. In Decem-
ber 1965 it was reconstituted by General Assembly Resolution 2103
(XX) and enlarged by the addition of four countries. It met at
United Nations Headquarters in New York City from March 8 until
April 25, 1966.
"Peaceful Co-Existence"
The compendious title of this U.N. committee is a euphemism for
"peaceful co-existence," an old stalking horse in the cold war. The
use of more elaborate language, however, is more than an attempt to
dress up in a fancy package some old concepts. It represents, on the
contrary, an effort to meet the propaganda challenge of the Soviet
bloc and to reduce it to the size of workable, legal propositions.
Much has been written on peaceful co-existence.' It would un-
* The author is a member of the New York Bar. He received his LL.B. from
Yale University Law School (1931).
1 There is an excellent bibliography in Lee, "The Mexico City Conference
of the United Nations Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States," 14 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q., 4th Series, 1296, 1298 n.8 (1965). Note particularly McWhinney,
"Peaceful Coexistence" and Soviet-Western International Law (1964), the
cited articles by McWhinney and Hazard, and the speech by Gore, "Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations among States," 47
Dept. of State Bull. 972 (1962). See also "The Soviet Impact on International
Law," 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. No. 4 (1964), and particularly in this
symposium Karpov, "The Soviet Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and its
Implications for International Law," at 858; Lerner, "The Historical Origins
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duly lengthen this discussion to review developments in the General
Assembly from 1961 to date and in the International Law Association
since the Dubrovnik Conference of 1956. There are no illusions
among Western lawyers regarding the "peaceful" character of the
Soviet initiative.' It is quite clear that a major objective is to foment
wars of liberation in order to assist allegedly "enslaved peoples" in
their struggles against allegedly "imperialist oppressors." The "just"
war is thus espoused and the use of force advocated. "Co-existence"
does not imply any truce between the opposing systems. The 1961
words of Krushchev will be recalled, that peaceful co-existence repre-
sents "a form of intensive, economic, political, and ideological struggle
of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the
international arena." I There is no doubt that the Soviet bloc contin-
ues to regard the present relationship between the two systems as a
phase in the class struggle, although at the moment a phase taking a
somewhat less violent form than that advocated by Peking.
The principles of peaceful co-existence enunciated in various
declarations have been, in the words of one expert, "formulated at a
very high level of generality and abstraction." I Understandably, there
has been persistent resistance to giving them concrete meaning. The
more general they are, the more suitable they are for diverse employ-
ment in various aspects of the cold war. The decision of the General
Assembly to establish an ad hoc body of legal experts to consider and
report on their legal content may, however, expose some of the hy-
pocrisy latent in communist propaganda, while at the same time it
may hopefully, with the aid of some of the newer States, develop some
measure of consensus on basic principles of international law.
Principles of "Peaceful Co-existence"
A list of principles and correlative duties was compiled at the
Seventeenth Session of the General Assembly (1962), on the basis
of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence," at 865; and Lipson, "Peaceful
Coexistence," at 871.
2 See particularly Lipson, op.cit.supra note 1.
8 Lipson, op. cit., at 875, 876.
4McWhinney, op.cit.supra note 1, at 36. He adds that the five primary
principles, "in their very generality and abstractness of formulation, have
served, intentionally or otherwise, to obscure or conceal frequently shifting
and changing, and often contending, Soviet operational approaches to the role
of international law . . ." id., at 37.
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of the so-called principles of peaceful co-existence submitted by the
Soviet bloc. Resolution 1815 (XVII) listed the following:
(a) The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations;
(b) The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security
and justice are not endangered;
(c) The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of any State, in accordance with the Charter;
(d) The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with
the Charter;
(e) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
(f) The principle of sovereign equality of States;
(g) The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations as-
sumed by them in accordance with the Charter.
At the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1963,
items (a), (b), (c), and (f) in the above list were discussed and
referred to the Special Committee established by Resolution 1966
(XVIII).' The Twentieth Session of the General Assembly in 1965
instructed the reconstituted Special Committee
To continue, in the light of the debates which took place in the Sixth Com-
mittee during the seventeenth, eighteenth and twentieth sessions of the
General Assembly and of the report of the previous Special Committee, the
consideration of the four principles set forth in paragraph 3 of Assembly
resolution 1815 (XVII), having full regard to matters on which the previous
Special Committee was unable to reach agreement and to the measure of
progress achieved on particular matters . . .7
The Committee was also instructed to consider the remaining
three principles in Resolution 1815 (XVII) (i.e. items (d), (e), and
(g) listed above) and to submit a comprehensive report on the result
of its study of all seven. This the Committee has done, to the current
(Twenty-first) General Assembly.8
5 U.N. GenAss.Off.Rec. 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/5217) (1962), at 66.
6 U.N. Gen.Ass.Off.Rec. 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15 (A/5515) (1963), at 70.
7 U.N. Gen.Ass.Off. Rec. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 (A/6014) (1965), at 91,
92.
8 U.N. Doc. No. A/6230, 27 June 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the
"1966 Report").
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Organization of the 1966 Committee
The 1966 Committee was composed of the 27 States appointed
by the President of the Eighteenth General Assembly, pursuant to
Resolution 1966 (XVIII),
taking into consideration the principle of equitable geographical representa-
tion and the necessity that the principal legal systems of the world should be
represented
plus the four added by the General Assembly in 1965. For conve-
nience, the membership may be divided as follows:
7 "Western States"-Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States
2 "Far Eastern States"-Australia and Japan
5 "Eastern European States"-Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ro-
mania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia
6 "Asian and North African States"-Algeria, Burma, India,
Lebanon, Syria, and the U.A.R.
6 "Middle African States"-Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana,
Kenya, Madagascar, and Nigeria
5 "Latin American States"-Argentina, Chile, Guatemala,
Mexico, and Venezuela
The Committee decided at the outset to discuss first the principle
of the sovereign equality of States (para. f) in the hope that a measure
of unanimity on this subject (some consensus had emerged at Mexico
City) might encourage agreement on other items.9 This was followed
by-the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of a State (para. c); the threat or use of force (para. a); the
peaceful settlement of disputes (para. b); and finally the three items
not considered in Mexico City: the duty to co-operate (para. d in
Resolution 1815 (XVII)), the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples (para. e), and the principle that States
shall fulfil their obligations in good faith (para. f).1o
Some consensus was reached on items (b) and (d), none on
the others. Although the Committee's Report deals with each item
in the order in which it appears in Resolution 1815 (XVII), the
following analysis follows the chronological order of the discussion in
March and April of this year.
9 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.3, 9 March 1966, at 5.
10 1966 Report, at 113, 176, 246.
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1. Principle of Sovereign Equality of States
At the 1964 Mexico City Conference a consensus was reached on
the principle that "1. All States enjoy sovereign equality. As subjects
of international law they have equal rights and duties." 11 In the 1966
Committee this was slightly elaborated, at the insistence of Czechoslo-
vakia, by altering the second sentence to read:
They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the intema-
tional community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social,
political or other nature.12
At the Mexico City Conference unanimity had also been reached
on the following:
2. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
(a) States are juridically equal.
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States.
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State
are inviolable.
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political,
social, economic and cultural systems.
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its
international obligations, and to live in peace with other States."8
No alteration was made in this paragraph 2 by the 1966 Com-
mittee. A consensus was, therefore, reported on paragraph 1, with
the second sentence altered as set out above, and on the above para-
graph 2.
What occupied four sessions on the principle of sovereign equality
in March, 1966,1' was debate on several propositions that either
had not been raised in Mexico City, or had not been unanimously
supported there, and that also failed to reach the point of consensus
in 1966. These included the following subjects:
(a) Whether States have the right to dispose freely of their
natural wealth and resources;
(b) Whether every State has a duty to conduct its relations with
other States in conformity with the principle that the sovereignty of
each State is subject to the supremacy of international law;
"I U.N. Doc. No. A/5746, 16 Nov. 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the
"1964 Report"), at 163.
12 1966 Report, at 176.
'" 1964 Report, at 163.
14 U.N. Docs. Nos. A/AC.125/SRs 4, 5. 6, 7, March 10 and 11.
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(c) Whether a State has the right to remove foreign troops and
military bases from its territory;
(d) Whether a State has the right to conduct any experiment or
resort to any action which is capable of having harmful effects on
other States or endangering their security;
(e) Whether States have the right to take part in the solution
of international questions affecting their legitimate interests, etc.;
(f) Whether or not reasons of a political, social, economic,
geographical, or other nature can restrict the capacity of a State, etc.;
(g) Whether territories under colonial domination can be con-
sidered parts of the territory of the colonial power.
Of these seven issues, it is not necessary here to comment on
more than (a), (b), and (d). Item (c) had been proposed by the
U.A.R. but attracted little support: the drafting committee report
said with reference to it that "the progress made can only politely
be described as negligible." 1" On item (e) it reported that the issues
had been unsuitable "for hurried negotiation in the short period at
our disposal" (obviously the subject is highly political). 1 About (f)
it said there was merely "general agreement . . . to the effect that no
consensus was within reasonable distance" (again the issues are
political)." Item (g) came up later under "self-determination." On
the three items (a), (b) and (d) some significant observations were
made at the public sessions and some useful negotiations were ap-
parently conducted in the drafting committee; in fact on item (a) a
consensus was very nearly reached.
A. Sovereign Equality of States and Disposal of Natural Re-
sources (para. a of 1966 list). The subject of Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources has been raised repeatedly since the early de-
bates on draft Convenants on Human Rights. Although the adoption
of General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) in December, 1962,
should have made further discussion unnecessary, States hostile to
private enterprise have continued to employ the subject as a cold-
war issue in their attacks on the alleged imperialism of private capital
undertakings.
In Mexico City, Czechoslovakia included in its comprehensive
proposals the provision that
The sovereignty of a State is based on the inalienable right of every nation
15 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.33, at 3.
"I Id., at 4, para. D.
171d., at 4, para. E.
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to determine freely its own destiny and its social, economic and political
system, and to dispose freely of its national wealth and natural
resources . . .18
As no consensus was reached in 1964, it was raised again in 1966. On
this latter occasion Czechoslovakia again took the lead, proposing it
as an amendment to 2(e) of the Mexico City consensus, so that that
item would read:
Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems, and to dispose freely of its national wealth
and natural resources.'
It was thus separated from "the inalienable right of every nation to
determine freely its own destiny" and made applicable only to "Each
State."
During the debate Yugoslavia also considered it essential to
add "the right of States to dispose freely of their natural wealth and
resources," in keeping with the principles adopted by the U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development and by the Belgrade and Cairo
Conferences of "non-aligned countries." 20 This was supported by
Syria and the United Arab Republic, the latter referring to it as "a
fundamental and inalienable right." 21 In the view of the Polish expert
it was particularly important, since the natural resources of the de-
veloping countries formed the basis of their economic development
in general and their industrial progress in particular. "The time was
ripe for the inclusion of that element." 2
Similarly, the Algerian expert considered it essential that the
right of a State to dispose freely of its national wealth and natural
resources should be given a prominent place in any objective defini-
tion of the principle of sovereign equality. He was "surprised" that
such a right should be disputed "in those very quarters where the
territorial concept was a necessary and deciding factor in the recogni-
tion of any State." He failed to see how a State could be recognized
as having the exclusive right of control over its territory when, in a
special committee of jurists, some members disputed the right of that
State to dispose of its national wealth. Control over a territory, to
be effective, implied the full application of the second factor: i.e.,
18 1964 Report, at 148.
19 1966 Report, at 162.
20 U.N. Doc.No. A/AC.125/SR.4, March 10, 1966, at 7.
21 Id., SR.5, at 6 (U.A.R.) and 10 (Syria).
221 d., at 12.
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free disposal of the wealth encompassed by the boundaries of that
territory. Otherwise, the State concerned would no longer be sover-
eign, for it would have lost one of its component factors. The danger
of any such thesis was obvious, and was all the greater in view of
the dominant place held by economic problems in contemporary
international life. He therefore considered that "the right of a State
to dispose freely of its wealth and natural resources should have a
special place in the principle of sovereign equality and, in the formu-
lation of the principle, should be given a separate paragraph." 23
Mr. Hargrove of the United States pointed out, however, that
the General Assembly, after years of patient effort, had adopted a
resolution on this subject (Resolution 1803 (XVII)) and it would
continue to consider the matter at its forthcoming session. These
facts alone would seem to suggest that the Committee should not
rush in and try to cover the subject with a single brief provision.
Moreover, the topic was not particularly relevant to the principle of
sovereign equality. The right to dispose of natural resources is a
right that States, which are by definition sovereign, exercise in the
natural course of events. If the sponsors of the proposal insist that
it should be dealt with in the context of the principle of sovereign
equality, the United States would accept the Committee's decision,
provided that any statement on the subject is "a true statement of
law." It should recognize that the act of disposing of a State's national
wealth, like other activities of States, must be carried out in accordance
with the obligations of international law, including treaty obligations.2'
The United Kingdom delegation had no objection in principle
to the Czech proposal, but considered that the right of each State to
dispose freely of its national wealth and natural resources had to be
exercised "in conformity with and subject to the supremacy of inter-
national law." In that connection it should not be forgotten that
General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) contained a Declaration
on the matter which had been adopted after lengthy discussion. "It
was also important not to jeopardize contractual arrangements which
had been freely entered into and were now in operation." 25 In the
23 d., SR.6, at 10 and 11. These and other quoted passages in the text are
from the provisional or official summary records published by the United
Nations. It should be emphasized that they are not direct quotations of what
the speakers said, but are quotations from the summaries in the third person
as they appear in the published records.
24 Id., SR.5, at 15.
25 Id., SR.5, at 6.
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view of the Canadian expert "any proposition that a State had
the right to dispose of its national resources without regard to inter-
national obligations appeared incompatible with the concept of
sovereign equality of States." 28
Considerable support was forthcoming for a proposal by Kenya
to word the provision as follows:
Each State has the right to freely dispose of its national wealth and natural
resources. In the exercise of this right, due regard shall be paid to the
applicable rules of International Law and to the terms of agreements validly
entered into. 27
It is understood that, when the matter was referred to the
drafting committee, there was considerable off-the-record discussion
and a consensus was nearly reached. In the words of the rather color-
ful report of the Chairman (Mr. Paul Engo of Cameroon):
There was general agreement that this topic should be included, but diverse
views existed touching both form and substance. The nut which resisted
cracking appears to be the question whether or not qualifications should be
attached to the right of a State freely to dispose of its national wealth and
natural resources. This arose from the second half of the relevant pro-
vision of document A/AC.125/L.7 which states that 'due regard shall
be paid to the applicable rules of international law. . . .' Although general
agreement sailed very close, it was impossible to dock it at consensus.2 8
B. Sovereign Equality of States and Supremacy of International
Law (para. b. of 1966 list). In Mexico City, the United Kingdom
proposed that
Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in con-
26 Id., SR.7, at 8.
27U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.7.
28 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.33, at 3. The United Kingdom expert said
that, like the representative of Chile, he too regretted that owing to a lack
of unanimity in the drafting committee it had not been possible to include in
the text certain proposals which had gained wide support. He said that "a
compromise formula, incorporating a qualification to the effect that due
regard should be paid to the rules of international law, had seemed likely at
one stage, to command general acceptance. It applied also to the proposal con-
cerning experiments having harmful effects. In the course of negotiations
within the working groups and the Drafting Group a text had been prepared
which sought to combine that proposal with other proposals submitted by the
United Kingdom and Ghana concerning the duty of States to conduct their
relations with other States in accordance with international law; unfortunately
this composite text had failed, at the last moment, to gain unanimous support."
A/AC.125/SR.50, 22 April 1966, at 4, 5.
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formity with international law and with the principle that the sovereignty
of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law.29
As their expert, Ian Sinclair, observed at the 1966 Committee
meeting, that proposal had surprisingly not been accepted. There
were, of course, many divergent views on the relationship between
the concept of State sovereignty and the doctrine of the supremacy
of international law, but if international order were to have any real
substance it must be accepted that there is in existence a body of law
which regulates relations between States. He accordingly reintroduced
the proposal, explaining that the purpose of the amendment was to
formulate the general principle that the concept of sovereignty should
not in any way limit the concept of the supremacy of international
law.80
The Netherlands expert agreed that there could be no equality
of States without the supremacy of international law, and sovereignty
did not include the right of sovereign disregard of the legal existence
and legitimate interests of other States.81 There was support also
from Nigeria, Kenya, and Madagascar, as well as Canada, France,
and Italy. The Nigerian expert was reported as saying that his
delegation.
• . . attached paramount importance to the duty of States to conduct
their relations with other States in conformity with the principle that the
sovereignty of each State was subject to the supremacy of international
law. The issue today was not so much whether sovereignty constituted an
attribute of a State as it was the extent to which strict and dogmatic adher-
ence to the concept of absolute sovereignty was conducive to and compatible
with the functioning and development of international law and organization.
It should therefore be recognized that progress in international law, the
development of friendly relations among States and the maintenance of
international peace required a partial surrender by States of their sover-
eignty. The systems of international arbitration and compulsory judicial
settlement had not developed as rapidly as might have been hoped because
it was mistakenly considered that they limited national sovereignty. That
was not the fault of the developing nations, for they were ready to apply
that principle if they could be sure that the great Powers would do likewise.2
In contrast with the foregoing were the contentions made by
29 1964 Report, at 149.
80 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.5, at 5.
811 d. at 11.
32 Id. at 13.
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the representatives of Algeria, the Soviet Union, and Romania. The
Algerian expert is reported as having said that
He did not think international law was sufficiently coherent, precise or com-
plete for national sovereignty to be subordinated to its rules. States agreed,
at the very most, to abide by the obligations which they had freely assumed
---e.g. those assumed by a State on acceding to the Charter of the United
Nations-but in the present state of development of international law
States could not be asked to subordinate themselves to it in all respects.
Moreover, the principle that each State had the duty to comply fully and
in good faith with its international obligations already covered the notion
of the supremacy of a part of international law over State sovereignty . . .
A distinction should be drawn between an obligation voluntarily accepted
and the general imposition of a law made in other times by a small inter-
national community.
• . . The second reason why his delegation could not recognize the suprem-
acy of international law was that such supremacy could be considered only
in the context of each national constitution. Some constitutions made inter-
national law the supreme rule of their internal and external conduct, whereas
others expressly recognized that only certain rules of international law
stood at the apex of the legal hierarchy. It was therefore desirable, in
the present state of international law, to lay greater stress on the need for
strict compliance by States with their international obligations under
bilateral or multilateral agreements, rather than to impose a supremacy of
international law over State sovereignty.' 3
The Soviet expert naturally rejected any general limitation on
State sovereignty. The Committee should elaborate the fundamental
principles at the basis of international law, but it should not go beyond
this and undertake a detailed codification, as some had proposed.
He disagreed with the United Kingdom proposal.34 The Romanian
considered that the doctrine of supremacy might be interpreted "as
reflecting the idea of a supra-national law." As international law is
derived from the sovereignty of States, he concluded that it "could
not be directed against that sovereignty but should be based on rec-
ognition of it and should serve to strengthen and to affirm it." "
C. Sovereign Equality of States and Experiments Having Harm-
ful Effects (para. d. of 1966 list). As formulated by the United Arab
Republic, this proposition was in terms that "No State has the right
to conduct any experiment or resort to any action which is capable
of having harmful effects on other States.""
Il Id., SR.6, at 11.
84 Id., at 13.
851 d., SR.7, at 5.
8 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.9.
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On this Chairman Engo of the drafting committee recorded
"something tantamount to agreement concerning the substance."
However, he said, "its scope was considered by some to be too wide."
Among other things, the words "harmful effects" did raise difficult
questions of definition. He concluded rather optimistically:
Again, although a consensus eluded us, it would appear that time will
ripen negotiations into early success on this topic. I would recommend
that further consultations continue in the Special Committee and elsewhere.17
II. Duty Not To Intervene in Matters within the Domestic Jurisdiction
of any State
The subject of non-intervention was discussed at great length
at the Mexico City Conference, but the only consensus reached there
was on a statement that the Committee "was unable to reach any con-
sensus on the scope or content of this principle." 38
In 1966, ten meetings of the Special Committee were devoted
to it. Much of the discussion turned on the effect to be given to
General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) adopted on December 21,
1965.11 The operative provisions of that Resolution, adopted on the
Report of the First (political) Committee, read as follows:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently,
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and
cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from
it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment,
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere
in civil strife in another State.
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes
a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention.
4. The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to
ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the
practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter
of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situa-
tions which threaten international peace and security.
87 U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.125/L.33.
88 1964 Report, at 141.
89 U.N. Gen.Ass.Off.Rec. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11 (A/6014) (1965).
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5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic,
social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another
State.
6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence
of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure,
and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of
racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
7. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term 'State' covers both
individual States and groups of States.
8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those
contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII.
It was strenuously argued that this was not a legal formulation
of a principle or principles of international law, but a political declara-
tion, and that it was the duty of the Committee to spell out the legal
content of the principle of non-intervention. The Soviet bloc and
most of the less-developed States would have none of this. In their
view the General Assembly had spoken and it was the Committee's
task to proceed from there. It could not open up either the substance
or the phraseology of a text overwhelmingly approved by the inter-
national community. Where the Mexico City Conference had failed,
said the Czech expert, the General Assembly had brilliantly suceeded.
In those circumstances there was nothing for the Committee to do but
to incorporate this text in its recommendations.4" This was supported
by the Indian and Soviet representatives, the latter saying that
General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) was a fine example of inter-
national collaboration and the Declaration appearing in it took the realities
of international life into account: it was multilateral, it was universal and
it was addressed to all States, particularly those which were members of
the Special Committee. Some delegations having raised the question of
the relationship between political questions and legal questions, the General
Assembly had concluded that its documents should take the international
situation into account. The initiative taken by the USSR on that occasion
had been prompted by the fact that the debate was taking place in an
international atmosphere and by its desire to see aggression and intervention
cease throughout the world.41
40 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.8, 14 March 1966, at 5.
41 Id., at 14.
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It was also strongly supported by the Mexican and Venezuelan
experts, the latter saying that it
would probably have a favourable effect on international law and could
become a genuine source of law. In view of the fact that such Declarations
were regularly implemented by some States, there was every reason to
believe that in a fairly short space of time the Declaration contained in
resolution 2131 (XX) would constitute an element in the progressive
development of international law which could subsequently find its place
in the codification of international law. To be sure, the resolution had been
adopted by a political body, but it was doubtful whether in the case of the
text in question a clear distinction could be drawn between political and
legal considerations. 42
The relevance in international law of U.N. resolutions and
declarations was well put by the Canadian expert:
Resolutions and declarations of the General Assembly, as formal acts of
the United Nations, might have significance for international law, and that
significance would be even greater if they had been adopted unanimously.
The Special Committee, however, had duties of a legal character to dis-
charge: on the basis of the General Assembly's views concerning the nature
of the principle of non-intervention, it had to determine, define and develop
the obligations in respect of non-intervention that were incumbent on States
under international law. In fulfilling its duty of defining the international
law on the subject, the Special Committee should take the Declaration
expressing the political will and objectives of the United Nations as its
primary source.
. . . The Special Committee must put the principles of international law
concerning friendly relations among States in as firm a legal form as possible.
In response to the Algerian representative's question concerning the inade-
quacies of the Declaration as a legal text, he pointed out that, while a large
portion of the Declaration could be incorporated in a statement on inter-
national legal obligations with minimal drafting changes, other parts-which
his delegation fully supported as such-were not as precise as statements
of law should be. Thus, if the second sentence of operative paragraph 1
of the Declaration was to be included in a legal document, the word 'con-
demned' would be changed to 'prohibited.' In a political document, a
condemnation of all forms of interference with a State's cultural elements
raised little difficulty; but in a legal document, a prohibition of all such
interference would have to be developed and defined to give it the necessary
precision. 48
and by the Swedish:
The Special Committee's basic task was to elaborate principles of inter-
42 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.10, 15 March 1966, at 6.
48 Id., SR.11, at 13.
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national law contained in the United Nations Charter. If the Committee was
free to elaborate, amplify and clarify the often vague language of the
Charter, a fortiori it was free to elaborate, amplify and clarify the wording
of General Assembly resolutions. General Assembly resolutions were not
treaties binding on Member States."
There was a great difference, the French expert said, between
a unanimous expression of opinion by members of the Assembly
condemning intervention in the internal affairs of States and a defini-
tion of the legal aspects. He questioned the expression "personality
of the State" in paragraph 1 and the phrase "deprive peoples of their
national identity." He fully supported the views expressed by the
representatives of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada.
The United Kingdom representative had quite rightly pointed out that
"the legal concept of nonintervention related largely to the intention
of one State to force another State to change its internal order. That
intention must in fact exist, but it must at the same time be an ab-
normal or arbitrary form of coercion." He fully supported the "effort
at compromise and understanding" embodied in the General Assembly
Resolution, but he could not accept without reservations "a formula-
tion which appeared . . . to be in some parts too vague and in others
too diffuse and, in general, to be based more on concepts of inter-
national morality than on a rigorous juridical analysis." 46
There was also considerable debate on a formulation submitted
by Australia, Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Although this was not adopted, it is worth recording
what they proposed:
1. Every State has the duty to refrain from intervening, directly or indirectly,
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. Every State has
an inalienable right freely to choose its political, economic, social, or
cultural systems, without intervention by another State, and the right freely
to choose the form and degree of its association with other States, subject to
its international obligations.
2. In accordance with the foregoing principle:
A. Every State shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any other State.
B. No State shall take action of such design and effect as to impair or
destroy the political independence or territorial integrity of another State.
C. Accordingly, no State shall instigate, foment, organize, or otherwise
encourage subversive activities directed toward the violent overthrow of
44 Id., at 14.
45 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.12, 16 March 1966, at 5, 6, 13.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 1
Current Developments: UN / 111
another State, whether by invasion, armed attack, infiltration of per-
sonnel, terrorism, clandestine supply of arms, the fomenting of civil
strife, or other forcible means. In particular, States shall not employ
such means to impose or attempt to impose upon another State a specific
form of government or mode of social organization.
D. The right of States in accordance with international law to take appro-
priate measures to defend themselves individually or collectively against
intervention is a fundamental element of the inherent right of self-defence.
3. Nothing in the foregoing shall be construed as derogating from
A. the generally recognized freedom of States to seek to influence the
policies and actions of other States, in accordance with international
law and settled international practice and in a manner compatible with
the principle of sovereign equality of States and the duty to co-operate in
accordance with the Charter;
B. the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those
contained in Chapters IV through VIII. 46
This was criticized by some for failing to condemn threats against
the political, economic, and cultural elements of a State and for not
expressly providing that aid and assistance given to "peoples under
any form of foreign domination" does not constitute intervention.
Others charged that it attempted to justify "both intervention in the
domestic and foreign affairs of States and preventive war." There
was also too much emphasis on the use of force and not enough on
other forms of interference.
The United States expert replied that the sponsors of the pro-
posal had adopted the exact words of Article 2(4) of the Charter,
that it dealt with intervention in the domestic affairs of States because
that was what the Committee had been instructed to do, that wrongs
inflicted on "peoples" would be covered by the principle of self-
determination or the protection of human rights and not by non-inter-
vention, and that the latter "should not be made a sort of valise into
which any conceivable kind of legal or political wrong could be
stuffed." Turning to 2 D. of the proposal, he took it that nobody
claimed that States did not have the right to defend themselves against
any form of intervention whatsoever until the Security Council took
the necessary action. He would leave it to the critics of 2 D. to
delineate the forms of intervention against which a State was helpless
and against which it was not."'
46 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.13.
'7 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.16, 17 March 1966, at 17 and 18.
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The effort to deal with the subject on a legal basis, however,
failed, as the question was put to a vote whether the Committee should
"abide by" General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) and should
consider only "additional" proposals "with the aim of widening the
area of agreement" of the Resolution. The vote in favor of this pro-
posal was 22 to 8 with 1 abstention. The eight States voting against
it were Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Sweden abstained.'"
This virtually ended this phase of the Committee's work, as no
agreement could be reached on altering the text of the General As-
sembly Resolution, particularly after a vote of 19 to 10 to retain a
statement in the preamble stating that the Resolution "reflects a
universal legal conviction which qualifies it to be regarded as an
authentic and definite principle of international law." On this last
vote, Guatemala and Sweden joined Australia, Canada, and the
other dissenters, and Venezuela abstained.'"
After this unhappy development the drafting committee had
no alternative but to "abide by" Resolution 2131 (XX). That man-
date controlled its "negotiating machinery." While the fullest oppor-
tunity had been given to all members and non-members to participate
in examining the principle, and while all aspects had been given "equal
weight," the drafting committee "had encountered at every turn an
embarrassing lack of agreement." Nevertheless, the drafting com-
mittee's report said, "the exercise . . . had been useful in its own
"9 50way .... 0
il1. Principle that States Refrain from Threat or Use of Force
During the debate on this item, the members of the Committee
continued to fall into two groups. There was first the group that
considered the work should begin where the Mexico City Conference
had left off. The other, and larger group, followed the lead of Czecho-
slovakia in reopening old sores that had been largely healed, or at
least covered over, in 1964. As in the case of the debate on non-
intervention, there appeared to be less of a desire on the part of
48 U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.125/SR.17, 18 March 1966, at 15, Para. 41. There
was a separate vote on substituting "takes as a basis for its discussions" for
"will abide by." This proposal was defeated by a vote of 22 to 9, Sweden
voting with the others on this. Id., at 14, para. 38.
49 Id., at 14 para. 37.
50 U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.125/SR.47, 16 April 1966, at 4, 5.
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this group to reach a consensus on some points than to press "pro-
gressive" proposals.
At the end of the debate on this item in Mexico City, the drafting
committee had prepared two "Papers," the first of which represented
a near consensus on a set of principles." Only the United States, it
was said in the 1966 Committee, was unable to accept one phrase
("violate the existing boundaries" of a State-it insisted on the sub-
stitution of "change" for "violate"), but later, in the Sixth Committee,
the United States announced its acceptance of this text. 2 The other
"Paper" merely stated that "The Committee was unable to reach any
consensus on the scope or content of this principle." 11 By 13 votes
to 10, with 2 abstentions, the 1964 Committee had decided to put
Paper No. 2 to the vote first. It then adopted Paper No. 2 by a vote
of 11 to 2, with 12 abstentions."
Paper No. 1 on which, as noted above, there was a near con-
sensus, read as follows:
1. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations.
2. In accordance with the foregoing fundamental principles, and without
limiting its generality:
(a) Wars of aggression constitute international crimes against peace.
(b) Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging
the organization of irregular or volunteer forces or armed bands
within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the
territory of another State.
(c) Every State has the duty to refrain from instigating, assisting or
organizing civil strife or committing terrorist acts in another State,
or from conniving at or acquiescing in organized activities directed
towards such ends, when such acts involve a threat or use of force.
(d) Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force
to violate the existing boundaries of another State, or as a means
of solving its international disputes, including territorial disputes
and problems concerning frontiers between States.
51 1964 Report, at 50 and 51, para. 106.
52 This was reported in the 1966 Committee by the Canadian expert, U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.19, 21 March 1966, at 4. Sir Kenneth Bailey of
Australia also mentioned the United States statement in the Sixth Committee.
id., at 5.
53 1964 Report, at 60 ("Paper No. 2").
54 Id., at 67, paras. 107 and 108.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. I
114/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
3. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs affects the provisions of the Charter
concerning the lawful use of force.
As the General Assembly Resolution under which the 1966
Committee was functioning had requested the Committee
To continue, in the light of the debates which took place in the Sixth Com-
mittee ...and of the report of the previous Special Committee, the
consideration of the four principles set forth in paragraph 3 of Assembly
resolution 1815 (XVII), having full regard to matters on which the previous
Special Committee was unable to reach agreement and to the measure of
progress on particular matters" (emphasis added)55
the arguments in favor of accepting the text of Mexico Paper No. 1
appeared particularly cogent. Unfortunately, they were opposed by
the Soviet bloc and were not accepted by the "non-aligned" countries,
with the result that the hard work expended in Mexico City on the
formulation of Paper No. 1 appeared to have been wasted. Instead
of starting with the "progress" made in 1964, as required by Resolu-
tion 2103 (XX), the Committee was induced by the Communist
countries to debate at great length several controversial issues on
which no consensus could be reached.
A. Economic, Political, and Other Forms of Pressure. In the
proposal put forward by Czechoslovakia, which virtually ignored the
Mexico City formulation in Paper No. 1, the following paragraph
was included:
5. Every State has the duty to refrain from economic, political or any other
form of pressure aimed against the political independence or territorial
integrity of any State .. .5'
Speaker after speaker emphasized that the Charter in Article 2
(4) refers only to the "threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State," that "force" means
"armed force" and not "economic, political or other pressures," and
that it was not, therefore, appropriate to consider this item in relation
to Article 2 (4). Sir Kenneth Bailey of Australia pointed out that at
the San Francisco Conference an amendment to extend the prohibition
of Article 2 (4) to include "the threat or use of economic measures"
had been rejected. Forms of coercion other than armed force were,
in Australia's view, prohibited by other Charter provisions, notably
I' U.N. Gen.Ass.Off.Rec. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14 (A/6014)(1965), at 91,
92, para. 4(a).
51 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.16, para. 1 5.
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the provision relating to nonintervention." To add these now to
Article 2 (4) would, in the opinion of the French expert, be tanta-
mount to an amendment of the Charter or would at least be inter-
preting it contrary to the intention of its authors.58
These objections were swept aside by those advocating "a more
dynamic definition" of "force" than had been adopted in San Fran-
cisco." What is needed, it was said, are "progressive . . . proposals"
which meet the "needs of contemporary international life."6 In the
opinion of the Kenya representative it was "idle to pretend that pres-
sures of an economic and political character did not constitute the use
of force. The developing countries could not forget that such forms of
pressure had long been used to coerce them, against their will." Proof
of that was to be found in the records of the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development, and he mentioned "economic exploitation, political
interference, threats to withdraw technical assistance-all those means
had been employed to compromise the sovereignty of the States of the
Third World." In his opinion, if the authors of Article 2 (4) had
intended to limit it to "armed force," they could have said so, as they
had done in Article 46 (41?). He shared the view of those jurists who
considered that 2 (4) covers "any operation directed against another
State." "1
And so the debate ended with Australia, Canada, France, Nether-
lands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States insisting
that "force" in Article 2 (4) means "armed force," and most of the
other States advocating a much broader interpretation. Clearly there
was no consensus, although the Yugoslav at the end of the debate said
he was "encouraged" by the views expressed "that the principle of
non-intervention might cover" economic and political pressures as
well as armed force.62
B. Peoples Struggling Against Colonialism. Here again Czecho-
slovakia was on solid anti-consensus ground in urging that
3. Every State has the duty to refrain from all armed actions or repressive
measures of any kind directed against peoples struggling against colonialism
for their freedom and independence. 68
5 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.24, 24 March 1966, at 4, 5.
58 d., at 9.
59 Id., at 10 (U.A.R.) and 11 (Lebanon).
60 Id., SR. 19, at 9 (Czechoslovakia).
61 Id., SR.22, at 5.
62 Id., SR.26, at 15.
68 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.16, para. 1 3.
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and in excepting from the prohibition against the threat or use of force
"the use of force . . . in self-defence of peoples against colonial domi-
nation in the exercise of the right of self-determination." 64 In sup-
port of this proposition their expert cited the U.N. Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
the Belgrade Declaration of 1961, and the Cairo Declaration of
1964.65
This proposal, which Sir Kenneth Bailey of Australia said con-
cerned the question of so-called "wars of liberation," was attacked
by him on the ground that "under international law the right of self-
defence applied not to peoples but to States. Rebellion was outside
the sphere of international law." 6
In the view of the United Kingdom, it was not at all clear why
paragraph 3 had been included in the Czech proposal, as it had not
appeared in Mexico City and had nothing to do with the principle
under discussion. That principle related to the threat or use of force
against a State. If it was to be discussed anywhere, it should be
brought up in connection with the principle of self-determination.67
It was also noticeable that Czechoslovakia gave a very narrow
interpretation to the concept of self-defense under Article 51 of the
Charter in contrast to a very wide construction of the so-called right
of self-defense against colonial domination. There was no basis for
the latter in the General Assembly Resolutions cited (1514 (XV) and
2105 (XX)). "The so-called right of self-defence of peoples against
colonial domination had no warranty whatsoever either under inter-
national law or under the Charter." 16
There was considerable disagreement with this, of course, from
the so-called "non-aligned" States. The Czech view was supported
by India, reference being made to the Bandung Declaration and to
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and by Yugoslavia,
Syria, Ghana, and Algeria. In the Algerian view, the United Kingdom
position
amounted to a rejection of everything the United Nations had done in the
64 Id., para 1 7.
65 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.18, 21 March 1966, at 12 and 13. The
Belgrade and Cairo Declarations are reproduced in part in U.N. Gen.Ass. Off.
Rec. 20th Sess., Sixth Committee, Agenda Item 92, A/C.6/L.537/Rev.1/Add.
1, at 49, 50 and 51.
66 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.19, at 6.
67 Id., SR.21, at 6.
68 Ibid.
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field of decolonization. Either the right of colonized peoples to self-deter-
mination was recognized or they were being kept in a state of subordination
and exploitation, in which case their only recourse was self-defence. 69
Sensitive issues were thus injected into what should have been
a co-operative effort to find common ground. Agreement on the
subject of threatening or using force was, however, clearly less an
objective of Czechoslovakia than fanning the flames of anti-imperi-
alism.
At the end of the session the drafting Committee reported a
consensus on the following two points:
1. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations.
2. Wars of aggression constitute international crimes against peace for
which there is responsibility under international law. 70
No agreement was reached on any other points.7 The near-
consensus achieved at Mexico City thus appears to have gone down
the drain.
IV. Principle of the Settlement of Disputes by Peaceful Means
In Mexico City no agreement had been reached on the principles
governing the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
This is not surprising in view of the position taken by communist States
that the overriding principle of sovereign independence prevents any
form of mandatory dispute settlement.
In the debates of the 1966 Committee the basic differences be-
tween the Eastern dogma of pure sovereignty and the Western accep-
tance of compulsory adjudication were made abundantly clear.
Czechoslovakia led off with a proposed declaration that
1. Every State shall settle its international disputes solely by peaceful means
so that international peace, security and justice are not endangered.
2. Having regard to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute, the
parties to any international dispute shall first seek its just settlement by
negotiating, and shall use, whenever appropriate and by common agree-
69 Id., SR.26, at 11 and 12.
70 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/7, 20 April 1966.
7In fact the 1966 Report merely records that the Committee took note of a
report of the drafting committee "that it had been unable to present an agreed
formulation of the principle . . ." See para. 155. The report referred to is
reproduced in para. 567.
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ment, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, in strict accord with the Charter of
the United Nations, or other peaceful means.
3. International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign
equality of States, in the spirit of understanding and without the use of any
form of pressure.72
As the United Kingdom representative pointed out, the concept
of "negotiation," to which paragraph 2 of the above proposal gives
primacy, is ambiguous. It could mean that the parties should simply
come together and try to define the political or legal issues which
divide them, or it could mean that the parties should resolve their
differences by mutual concessions. If a demand by one State against
another, particularly in the case of a strong State against a weaker one,
should be unjustified, the requirement that the parties negotiate and
make mutual concessions might in fact result in an injustice. In such
situations, some other mode of settlement, such as mediation and good
offices by a third party, arbitration, or judicial settlement might well
be more appropriate."'
There was extensive support for this criticism. Communist ideol-
ogy cannot accept arbitration or judicial settlement except on an
ad hoc basis; hence the primacy accorded negotiation. To be sure
it does appear at the head of the list of peaceful settlement methods
in Article 33 of the Charter, but to transform this into a firm obligation
ahead of all methods would clearly be a distortion of the Charter and,
in fact, an attempt to alter its provisions without resorting to the
procedures for amendment.
The result of four days debate on this subject was not much, but
it was something. In the context of the cold war nature of the entire
exercise, it was not without significance, as many representatives
pointed out. What emerged were the following six principles, adopted
unanimously:
1. Every State shall settle its international disputes with other States by
peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered;
2. States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their interna-
tional disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other
peaceful means of their choice. In seeking such a settlement the parties shall
12 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.16, part II.
" U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.27, 31 March 1966,.at 6.
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agree upon such peaceful means as may be appropriate to the circumstances
and nature of the dispute;
3. The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of failure to reach
a solution by any one of the above peaceful means, to continue to seek a
settlement of the dispute by other peaceful means agreed upon by them;
4. States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States, shall
refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation so as to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, and shall act in accor-
dance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations;
5. International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign
equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of
means. Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed
to by the parties shall not be regarded as incompatible with sovereign
equality;
6. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs prejudices or derogates from the
applicable provisions of the Charter, in particular those relating to the
pacific settlement of international disputes.74
From the foregoing, it will be noted that the language of Article
33 of the Charter is incorporated in the first sentence of paragraph
2 without distortion, but that that sentence applies to all international
disputes, and not merely to those "the continuance of which" (in
the language of the Charter) is "likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security." The latter type of dispute may,
of course, under Articles 34 through 38, be brought before the Security
Council, and such submission is made mandatory by Article 37, if
the parties fail to settle it by means indicated in Article 33.
Nevertheless, the Soviet bloc succeeded in preventing any sug-
gestion in the agreed text of any form of compulsory settlement. And
they maintained in paragraph 5 the principle of settling disputes "on
the basis of the sovereign equality of States," with the substitution of
"in accordance with the principle of free choice of means" in place
of "in the spirit of understanding and without the use of any form of
pressure." "
At the same time, advocates of binding settlement procedures
succeeded in adding, "Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement pro-
cedure freely agreed to by the parties shall not be regarded as incom-
patible with sovereign equality." A strenuous effort was made to
incorporate at least a reference to the International Court of Justice.
In his opening remarks, the United Kingdom expert urged greater
74 1966 Report, at 113.
75 The latter phrase had appeared in paragraph 3 of the Czech proposal,
supra n.72.
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acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction and, as a corollary of or induce-
ment to such acceptance, a strengthening of the rule of law in inter-
national relations by the progressive development and codification of
international law. At the same time, he pointed out, greater use of
the Court would itself lead to such development. 78
To this the Czech expert replied that the means of settlement
should be left to free choice ("by agreement resulting from negotia-
tions"), which could not be made in advance and could not be im-
posed on States. It should not be forgotten, he said, that the Court
"had been established for the settlement of international disputes of a
purely legal nature." There were other shortcomings, notably the
lack of adequate representation on the Court of the newer African
and Asian States.7 The real objection of all the communist States
to advance acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, however, is their
contention that it impairs sovereignty.
The Japanese expert also strongly urged strengthening the role
of the Court. More States should accept its jurisdiction, so that the
role of judicial organs in the peaceful settlement of disputes would be
enhanced. It was encouraging that some newly independent States,
such as Kenya and Nigeria, had accepted compulsory jurisdiction.
At the Mexico City Conference, Japan had proposed that "Every State
should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the . . . Court . . . as
soon and with as few reservations as possible." The 1966 Committee
was urged to give this due attention.7"
The Soviet expert recognized resort to the Court as one method
of settling disputes, but insisted that negotiation was the principal
one and that was why it had been put first in San Francisco. There
were many more settlements by negotiation than by recourse to an
international tribunal! 7'
To the representative of France it would be unthinkable to adopt
a formulation reproducing terms of the Charter without expressly
recalling the importance of recourse to the Court and the express
provision in Article 36 that "legal disputes should as a general rule
be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice." Cer-
tainly, criticisms voiced in Mexico City should be thoroughly studied.
76 Supra n. 73, at 7.
77 Id., at 12.
71 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.29, 27 March 1966, at 5.
79 ld., at 7.
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The effective operation of international justice was indissolubly linked
with respect for the law itself."0
As had been done by the Japanese expert, reference was made
by the representative of Canada to General Assembly Resolution 171
(II) which had paraphrased the above provision in Article 36: "as
a general rule . . .States should submit their legal disputes to the
International Court of Justice."
Therefore, he said, it seemed, to say the least, improper for the
General Assembly to formulate a principle concerning the peaceful
settlement of disputes without mentioning the International Court.8 1
There was strong support for this from Italy, Mexico, and Nigeria.82
Despite these pleas, the ICJ is not mentioned in the text adopted
by the Committee. The Polish expert said that acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction "seemed unlikely at present," pointing out that
the Vienna Conferences of 1961 and 1963 had rejected compulsory
jurisdiction for the purposes of the conventions on diplomatic and
consular relations. States rarely resorted to the Court, tending to
settle their disputes, including legal disputes, by negotiation. 8
When the Chairman of the drafting committee reported on this
item, he said that the proposed recommendations 84 had been "born
in compromise." Two specific explanations were made by him. Re-
ferring to paragraph 5, he said that the phrase "Recourse to, or
acceptance of, a settlement procedure freely agreed to by the parties"
was intended to cover not only recourse to or acceptance of a settle-
ment procedure by the parties to an existing dispute, "but also the
acceptance in advance by States of an obligation to submit future
disputes or a particular category of future disputes to which they might
become parties to a specific settlement procedure." Referring to
paragraph 6, the phrase "provisions of the Charter" was intended to
refer to the Charter "as a whole. That made the meaning of the words
'in particular' clearer." 88 Speaking for the United States, Hargrove
said that it was specially important that paragraph 6 should refer to
all the provisions of the Charter, "since it would not be consistent with
international law to say that a party to a dispute against which force
80 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.30, 30 March 1966, at 6.
81 Id., SR.31, at 3.
82 Id., at 6 (Italy); SR.32, at 10 (Mexico) and 11 (Nigeria).
83 Id., SR.31, at 4.
84 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/6. This is reproduced in the 1966 Report in
para. 248, at 113.
85 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.49, 21 April 1966, at 3,4.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 1
122/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
had been used would be violating the principle of pacific settlement
by exercising its right of self defence." 88
V. Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.
Having completed consideration of the four principles dis-
cussed at the Mexico City Conference, the Committee took up the
remaining three principles in Resolution 1815 (XVII). The first of
these, "the duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance
with the Charter," appears of marginal legal significance and will
not be discussed here. The questions of "self-determination" and
"good faith performance of obligations," however, involve some in-
teresting legal aspects and will be briefly reviewed.
Since the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Soviet Union
has persistently exploited the principles of "equal rights and self-
determination of peoples." The expression was included in paragraph
2 of Article 1 at its insistence. The United States delegation felt at
the time that it could be used as a cover for Soviet expansionism, but
agreed that it would be difficult to oppose the principle."7 It is not
surprising that the Soviet Union has since then repeatedly employed
it as a device for stirring antagonisms between developing countries
and the West.
In the discussion of this subject in the 1966 Committee, the
U.S.S.R. continued to pose as the champion of allegedly oppressed
peoples seeking to break the yoke of colonialist and imperialist domi-
nation. It offered to provide material assistance in their struggles for
freedom and independence and insisted that armed force could be
employed for this purpose.88
Possibly more than in the case of any other principle, this one
has appealed to the Soviet Union as a particularly powerful means
of sowing discord. There is nothing in the Charter, however, to sug-
gest that it be confined to colonialist situations. On the contrary
there were good reasons for considering it of general application.
The newer countries of Asia and Africa, as well as the countries of
Latin America, supported the Communist emphasis on colonialist
situations, whereas the United States and other Western powers insisted
that it be treated generally. Asserting that it alone was seeking to
88 Id., at 10.
81 Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (1958), at
811.
88 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.43, 12 April 1966, at 11, 12.
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"elucidate the content of the principle" and to formulate it "in such a
manner that it would be scrupulously respected by all States and im-
plemented without delay," the Soviet Union attacked a proposal made
by the United States as not even attempting to do more than "laconi-
cally" indicate that every State has the duty to respect the principle
and to impose limits on it. This was no more, said the Soviet expert,
than attempting "to return to the era of colonial domination." Such
a return, he said, is unthinkable. The principle had finally won ac-
ceptance "owing to the efforts of some progressive countries, including
in particular the Soviet Union, which was proud that it had been the
first to enact an instrument formally proclaiming the principle and
also to have included it in the many treaties which it had concluded
with various Socialist States." 11
The U.S. proposal, he said, contained no provision that colo-
nialism is contrary to international law and the Charter. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, "had always condemned the attitude of
colonial Powers which, by their words, accepted certain obligations,
but did not respect them in their deeds." The 23rd Congress of the
Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. had solemnly affirmed that "those
who were fighting against foreign domination to obtain their indepen-
dence and their freedom would always enjoy the active support of
the Soviet Union. The process of liberation of peoples was irrevers-
ible and his delegation believed that they were entitled to use all
and every means at their disposal in order to implement their right of
self-determination." 90
In formulating this principle, he said, the Committee must em-
phasize that "any form of colonialism or neo-colonialism" should not
be tolerated and must be considered unlawful. Military bases are a
means of bringing pressure on nations and retard their emancipation.
Nothing could justify their maintenance, "particularly if they were
being maintained in defiance of the will of the countries in which they
were situated." Some colonial powers still considered that the terri-
tories they administer are integral parts of their own territory. That
attitude is a violation of the norms and principles of international
law and should be condemned."
The position taken by the United States had the support of
Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
89 Ibid.
90 Id., at 12.
1 Id., at 13.
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and also of some of the developing countries. 2 After stating the
basic principle in terms of paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Charter,
the U.S. proposal listed certain criteria to govern the applicability of
the principle in particular cases. It would be applicable in the case
of a colony or other non-self-governing territory, of a zone of occupa-
tion ensuing upon the termination of military hostilities, and of a trust
territory. It would be prima facie applicable where sovereignty is
exercised by a State "over a territory geographically distinct and
ethnically or culturally diverse from the remainder of that State's
territory."
In these cases, where the principle is applicable, the power
exercising authority must maintain a readiness to accord self-govern-
ment to the people concerned through their free choice. The principle
is satisfied by the restoration of self-government, or, in the case of
territories not having previously enjoyed self-government, by its
achievement through the free choice of the people concerned. The
proposal concludes with the provision:
The existence of a sovereign and independent State possessing a representa-
tive Government, effectively functioning as such as to all distinct peoples
within its territory, is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and
self-determination as regards those peoples.
In introducing the U.S. proposal, Ambassador Nabrit em-
phasized that the Committee was discussing, not "the desirability
of respecting" the principle, but "the legal obligation to do so." This,
he said, represents "a relatively new development in the history of
mankind." Although he did not consider that an agreed statement
could be prepared in the short time available to the Committee, he
considered it helpful that the Committee was discussing a legal
obligation. Clearly no rational international legal order could exist
if the Charter were taken to sanction an unlimited right of secession
by indigenous peoples from sovereign and independent States. No
such right could be found in the Charter. The Charter does, however,
provide a standard by which to judge the legitimacy of the modes
of political organization imposed upon peoples within the framework
of a world community composed of sovereign States. The United
States proposal was intended to express that standard in the phrase
in paragraph B "possessing a representative Government, effectively
functioning as such as to all distinct peoples within its territory."
92 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.32.
92 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.44, 13 April 1966, at 6 to 8.
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Ambassador Nabrit did not think that other proposals before
the Committee met the requirements of the Committee's duties.
Moreover, they raised a range of problems which had already con-
fronted the Committee in connection with other principles. These
were problems having to do basically with the scope of the lawful
use of force in international relations. There is no justification in
the Charter, as regards the lawful use of force, for any separate
and special treatment of colonial or other situations involving the
principle of self-determination. He thus squarely took issue with the
position of the communist States. Criticizing expressions such as
"the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and ex-
ploitation as well as any other forms of colonialism," he emphasized
that the texts produced by the Committee would be thrust into the
arena of international political relations, where language of that sort
had already acquired its own special connotation-a connotation
by which, as has been seen on too many recent occasions, "it was
directed by States against other admittedly sovereign and indepen-
dent States for extraneous reasons of politics, ideology, or territorial
acquisitiveness." 9,
It was also the view of the United Kingdom expert that the lan-
guage of the Charter could not support a claim "that a part of a sover-
eign independent State was entitled to secede from that State" or the
suggestion that administering Powers are not the final arbiters in ques-
tions affecting the implementation of the principle of self-determina-
tion in the territories under their administration. Non-self-governing
territories vary enormously in size, resources and population.
Some might neither wish nor be physically able to assume the full
responsibilities of independent statehood. Nor could the principle
of self-determination be confined "within the strait-jacket of current
preoccupations over decolonization, although its application to the
process of decolonization was recognized." It was a principle of
universal application."
The Australian delegate, in particular, "rejected the derogatory
description which had been given of the international trusteeship sys-
tem" and emphasized that this "was an honourable and accepted part
of the machinery established by the Charter."
04 Id., et 8.
95 d., at 9, 10.
96 Id., at 14.
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Nothing was resolved at this session of the Committee on this
subject.
VI. Principle that States Fulfil Obligations in Good Faith
The concluding item on the Committee's agenda was derived
from the provision in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Charter that all
Members "shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them
in accordance with the present Charter."
Innocuous as this clause appears, it provided a convenient
opportunity for the expression of conflicting views on fundamental
provisions of international law. Czechoslovakia, as usual, led off,
proposing the following:
1. Every State shall strictly observe the generally recognized principles and
norms of international law and shall fulfil, in good faith, its obligations
arising from international treaties freely concluded by it on the basis of
equality and in conformity with the above principles.
2. Every State has the duty to conduct its international relations in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the principles con-
tained in the present Declaration."
It will be readily apparent that the first paragraph in the above
proposal contains three jokers. The obligation to fulfil treaties in
good faith is limited (a) to those "freely concluded," (b) to those
concluded "on the basis of equality," and (c) to those concluded
"in conformity with the above principles." The "above principles"
are those set out in the earlier part of Czechoslovakia's declaration,
most of which had already failed to win unanimous support.
In commenting on this proposal, Ambassador Nabrit said that
the United States has no objection to some general reference to the
many rules of treaty law by which the validity of international agree-
ments are determined. Any such reference should, however, logi-
cally incorporate all of the rules of treaty law. 8 This view was sup-
ported by the United Kingdom expert. The position that certain
treaties called "unequal treaties" are invalid, he said, is "a somewhat
controversial point in the law of treaties." The United Kingdom would
prefer to await the conclusions of the International Law Commission
before taking a position on this. In the meanwhile, he suggested,
it seems unnecessary to mention that asserted ground of invalidity.
97 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/L.16.
91 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.46, 14 April 1966, at 7.
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There are many reasons why a treaty might be invalid and there is
no merit in mentioning one rather than another.9
The United States and the United Kingdom submitted a joint
proposal as follows:
1. Every State has the duty to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed
by it in accordance with the Charter.
2. In particular:
A. (1) The obligations of treaties and other obligations of international
law may not be lawfully avoided on grounds of incompatibility with either
national law or national policy;
(2) Upon the faithful performance of such obligations rests the right
to exact and enjoy similar performance by others.
B. States Members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies
have the duty
(1) to fulfil in good faith the obligations placed upon them by the
constitution, rules of procedure, and mandatory decisions of those organiza-
tions, and
(2) so to conduct their participation that the organizations them-
selves act in conformity with their constitutional rules of procedure and
mandatory decisions and that the constitutional rights of other Members
are not impaired.
C. Where obligations arising out of international agreements are in
conflict with the obligations imposed upon Members of the United Nations
by the Charter of the United Nations, the latter obligations shall prevail. 109
In introducing this proposal, Ambassador Nabrit pointed out "'
that paragraph 1 merely reproduces the relevant general provision in
the Charter. Paragraph 2 A. deals in its first sentence with the basic
relationship between international legal organizations and the na-
tional policy of States. Just as one could not conceive of a national
legal order in which citizens reserve the right to participate in the
legal order or not, according to their own decisions and needs, one
could not think of an international order in which States are not
similarly bound. This is an important statement of principle and
confirms the supremacy of international law over municipal law.
The second sentence of 2 A. also contains a statement of fact, namely,
that the international legal system could only survive to the extent that
the burdens imposed on each member are duly borne.
Paragraph 2 B. deals with the obligations of U.N. Members aris-
ing from the constitution, rules of procedure, and mandatory pro-
99 Id., at 10 to 12.
100 U.N. Doe. No. A/AC.125/L.37.
101 Id., SR.46, at 7, 8.
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visions of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The
second sentence of 2 B. states an equally important application of
the principle of good faith. U.N. organizations are legal institutions,
capable of making decisions, and having responsibilities, power,
and competences clearly laid down in their constitutions. That is
the difference, Ambassador Nabrit said, between the United Nations
and "a mere periodic gathering of representatives of Governments for
the purpose of exchanging views." It was a difference to be "zealously
guarded." 102
Although, in the view of the United Kingdom expert, it is
tautological to state that obligations must be fulfiled, the statement
does have value as a re-examination of the rule of pacta sunt servanda
which underlies the legal force of the Charter. In addition, there
are two aspects which are as valid now as they were at San Francisco
in 1945. It was then said that Article 2(2) of the Charter means
not merely that a Member fulfilling its duties and obligations may
exercise certain privileges and rights but also that, if all Members
of the Organization fulfil their obligations, all Members will receive
the benefits of the Charter. The United Nations is a collectivity
whose high purposes can be achieved only if all Members scrupu-
lously fulfil their obligations.
In addition to the element of "obligation," this principle also
involves the concept of "good faith." Credit for the introduction of
the latter in the Charter must go to the jurists of South America. It
was the representative of Colombia who had stressed that it was not
enough to say that States should fulfil their obligations; the concept
of good faith has to be added. There is a school of political philosophy
which attaches no value whatever to good faith. The Colombian
representative considered that the United Nations should condemn
this, because international life requires a minimum of morality.
The United Kingdom expert pointed out that the rule of good
faith is not limited to Charter obligations, but applies to treaty obli-
gations generally. This appears from article 55 of the draft articles
on the law of treaties contained in the report of the sixteenth session
of the International Law Commission. The same principle applies,
he said, to obligations deriving from other sources of international
law. o08
All of this seems rather elementary, but the force of the U.S./
102 Id., at 8.
'10 8 Id., at 10, 11.
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U.K. position was highlighted by the U.S.S.R. statement. Empha-
sizing the importance of pacta sunt servanda and the principle of
good faith ("the most long-standing principle of international law"),
the Soviet expert said that normal peaceful relations among States
would be impossible, and peaceful co-existence among States having
different political, economic, or social systems would be an idle phrase,
if the rule of pacta sunt servanda was not observed. Violation of that
rule could even lead to wars of aggression,
as witness the international repercussions of the fact that an imperialist
State was violating the obligations arising from the agreements signed at
Geneva in 1954. Such a violation might seriously affect the peaceful way
of life of peoples, and it caused very deep anxiety.1""
Ambassador Nabrit dealt with this provocative observation by
pointing out that the Geneva Agreement of 1954 had been broken
by the North Viet-Namese. They had made free elections impossible.
That was deplorable, as it had made it impossible for the South Viet-
Namese to comply with the 1954 Agreement. The United States
had always been ready to abide by that agreement, and "it yielded
to no nation in its adherence to international law." 106
The basic difference between the U.S./U.K. position and that
of the U.S.S.R. emerged from the latter part of the Soviet statement.
The world, it said,
saw too many examples of the way in which some colonial Powers invoked
the rule pacta sunt servanda in demanding compliance with leonine agree-
ments which they had concluded with their former colonies. Such actions
violated the principle of good faith, since the agreements in question were
iniquitous in their terms and had been obtained by means which were the
very negation of the principles of international law, negation of the princi-
ples of international law, particularly the principle of sovereign equality
of States . . . any agreements imposed during a period of colonial domina-
tion and designed to restrict the sovereignty of States and peoples about to
gain their independence could not be considered lawful. 100
The Committee must, therefore, help to assist developing coun-
tries which seek to reject "inequitable agreements that had been im-
posed on them" and should indicate that States are required to
fulfil their obligations on the basis of the principles of international
law, and not in contravention of them." 7
104 Id., at 4, 5.
10s Id., at 7.
108 Id., at6.
107 Id., at 7.
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At the end of the session, Ambassador Nabrit reverted to the
comments made by the Soviet delegate on Viet-Nam. He regretted
that, despite the rule adopted by the Committee,
acrimonious statements based on political considerations had once again
been made, to the detriment of the Committee's work. The United States
presence in Viet-Nam was aimed solely at helping that country to resist
the many violations of the principles of the Charter and of international
law committed against it . . . the United States delegation found it particu-
larly difficult to accept righteous protestations from those who were most
notorious for their failure to fulfil their obligations, although they were
perhaps more conspicuous for their skill in misrepresenting contemporary
events by means of unfounded interpretations. 08
He might have added a reference to the peaceful co-existence
that prevailed with the Baltic States before they were compulsorily
incorporated into the Soviet Union. However, the above observations
were sufficient to provoke a final fling from the Soviet delegate, which
closed the discussion on item (g). Their representative is recorded
as saying that he:
expressed his appreciation to the United States delegation for the generous
ideas it had always expressed regarding the need to fulfil international
obligations. However, there was a vast difference between words and deeds
and it would be recognized that, in the present instance, the deeds of the
United States Government in Viet-Nam were contrary to the Geneva
Agreements. In order to comply with those Agreements, that Government
should-as was desired, moreover, by the people of the United States-
withdraw the troops it was maintaining in Viet-Nam and halt the war of
aggression which was not desired by the Viet-Namese people. No matter
what pretext was used, the violation of the Agreements impaired the effec-
tiveness of the work with which the Special Committee was concerned.
However, there was perhaps truth in the popular Russian saying that words
written with the pen could not be destroyed with the axe. Force could not
destroy the work of jurists who, by their vocation, had to condemn war as
the negation of legality.' 09
Conclusion
At the end of the session, there was an exasperated outburst
from the "non-aligned" nations on the failure to reach agreement on
the "duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with
the Charter" (so-called principle (d) in Resolution 1815 (XVII),
but designated V in the Report and discussed in that order in the
108 Id., at 18.
109 Id., at 18, 19.
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Committee.) Because this paper has already exceeded the limits of
reasonable length, and because the legal content of this item appears of
less significance than that of the others, there has been no analysis
of it. Suffice it to say that the exasperation stemmed from the refusal
of one unnamed State to agree upon a set of words dealing with co-
operation "in the economic, social, technical and trade fields . . .
free from discrimination based on differences in political, economic
or social systems." Such refusal did not accord with the spokesman's
"understanding of how the principle of co-operation should work."
What was considered disappointing in this respect, he said, was
the operation of the Committee's decision to formulate its conclusions
on the basis of unanimity. In this instance, the recalcitrance of one
member, on what was said to be a matter of semantics and having
"nothing to do with the substance of the matter," had "interfered with
the Committee's work." The "non-aligned," it was said, had not
availed themselves of their right to insist on decisions by majority
vote. They would continue that course and not ask for a vote. How-
ever, they felt bound to say that the method of seeking general agree-
ment tended to distort positions. At the forthcoming General As-
sembly rigid positions must not hamper the progress of the work. To
facilitate the formulation of principles and the adoption of a declara-
tion, they had accordingly decided to resort to the vote, both in the
General Assembly and at future sessions of the Committee.1 '
This statement demonstrates the difficulty of formulating in the
U.N. arena principles of "law" to govern relations among States, even
where such formulation is delegated to a comparatively small group
of legal experts. Quite clearly there are not only diverse viewpoints
on economic, social, and political matters, but on the nature of "law"
and "obligation" in the inter-State context and the role of lawyers in
defining the contours of such highly charged and controversial con-
cepts as non-intervention, aggression, self-determination, and the basic
relation of "law" to "sovereignty." At one extreme is the Soviet view
that the supremacy of the State is absolute, that the State is bound
only by what it "freely" and on a basis of "equality" accepts. At the
other is the Western view that the rules of public international law are
sufficiently developed to constitute a workable system of restraint on
110 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.52, 25 April 1966, at 5, 6. The statement
was made by the representative of Lebanon on behalf of Algeria, Burma,
Cameroon, Dahomey, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Nigeria,
Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.
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the exercise of sovereign power. In between are the contentions of
many new and less developed States, which are willing to accept some
limitations on sovereignty, but are suspicious of others, and above all
seek ever-increasing material benefits from the developed nations and
the elimination in areas of interest to them (notably central and South
Africa) of all forms of domination and interference. Much stress is
placed by them on the duty of States to "co-operate" in economic
matters. To the "non-aligned" this includes acceptance of the "prin-
ciples" set out in the Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development."' Whether such a "duty to cooperate" can be imposed
is, of course, a proposition that the capital exporting States will doubt-
less continue to resist.
Against the surging impatience of the non-aligned with the care-
ful examination by Western experts of principles to which States would
be expected to adhere in their relations with other States, are the more
philosophical views of those trained in the legal disciplines of Europe
and the Western Hemisphere. There was no point, the French expert
said, in expressing more regret than the circumstances warranted. It
was a pity that the effort to narrow divergencies was not mentioned in
the Committee's Report, but that Report and the Report of the Mexico
City Conference would together form a very useful compendium for
those who would take up the work where the Committee had left off.
The fact that the search for compromise had its limits should cause no
regrets. There was a point "beyond which a too skilfully drafted text
could be very dangerous." 112
There were in fact, as Sir Kenneth Bailey of Australia pointed
out, many instances where divergent viewpoints had been brought
much closer together as a result of discussions. Nevertheless, he said,
there was a stage in that process at which it was no longer possible to
reach a compromise. "Beyond that stage, it was to be feared that any
further concessions would only lead to bad law." "I
Ambassador Nabrit concluded by expressing the opinion that
the session was by no means a failure.
The fact that agreement had been reached on the legal formulation of two
principles was in itself a considerable success. Moreover, when one con-
sidered that the members of the Committee had come very close to agree-
"' U.N. Gen.Ass.Off. Rec. 20th Sess., Sixth Committee, Agenda item 92,
A/C.6/L.537/Rev. I/Add. 1, 20 October 1965, at 92 to 98. The United
States voted against many of the principles set out in this document.
112 U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.125/SR.52, at 8.
118 Id., at 9.
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ment on the other five principles, the conclusion that its work had been
most constructive was justified...
In conclusion, he drew attention to the wisdom of the attitude adopted by
the non-aligned countries. The restraint they had demonstrated was fully
justified. The slowness with which results were achieved by the method of
general agreement might well give rise to impatience but those results had
a value far greater, when questions of international law were involved, than
that of results achieved by merely recording majority opinion.",
Whether the work of the Committee is to continue and whether,
if it is, there is to be the same concern for achieving unanimity in the
formulation of principles will probably be determined at the forth-
coming General Assembly. That body will again be exposed to the
impatience of the non-aligned with the concern of Western jurists for
carefully defining the legal content of general statements and with
the repeated castigation by the Soviet bloc of Western adherence to
allegedly outdated, colonialist, and imperialist concepts. Out of the
furnace of controversy, however, may yet emerge some sensible deter-
mination of the nature and content of basic principles of contemporary
international law.
114 Id., at 12, 13.
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